



Daily Report—

Sub-Saharan Africa

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Burundi

OAU Mission Ends Meeting 'Full of Optimism'

EA1304162095 Nairobi KNA in English 1245 GMT
13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Bujumbura, Burundi, 13 April (KNA/PANA)—The Organization of African Unity secretary general, Salim Ahmed Salim, says that everything is being done to head off greater mass killings of Burundians as two ethnic groups there grapple for power.

"We leave Burundi full of optimism. The government is doing its utmost to avoid the rwandisation of Burundi," he said yesterday.

Speaking over Radio Burundi at the end of his two-day visit to the country, he denied favouring foreign military intervention to stop the ethnic killings.

"The solution to Burundi's problems is the responsibility of Burundians themselves," he said. "Moderate tendencies do exist in the country. The OAU is willing to help them as much as possible." [passage omitted]

Mandate Extended Beyond 16 Jun

EA1304154395 Bujumbura ABP in French 0931 GMT
13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bujumbura, 13 April (ABP)—The number of personnel in the observer mission in Burundi is going to be increased from 47 to 67, the OAU secretary general, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, said during a press conference in Bujumbura on Wednesday [12 April] at the end of a visit to Burundi in which he headed a delegation of African ministers in the framework of achieving peace.

The decision was taken after a six-hour marathon meeting which brought together the OAU delegation and the National Security Council led by the president of the Republic of Burundi. The council includes all the political groupings. The two also agreed to extend the mandate of the mission, which was to have expired on 16 June 1995. [passage omitted]

The delegation arrived in Burundi at a time when the government and political leaders were engaged in a pacification campaign throughout the country. [passage omitted]

Rwanda

Radio Report Denies Attack on Zairian Camp

EA1304215095 Kigali Radio Rwanda in French 1115
GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Zairian Government has accused the Rwandan Army of having conducted the attack at a refugee camp in South Kivu where about 30 people were killed and a number of others wounded.

Zairian Foreign Minister Lunda Bululu has summoned the Rwandan charge d'affaires in Kinshasa to lodge an official protest.

The attack took place on Tuesday [11 April] at Birava refugee camp on Lake Kivu, which serves as the natural border with Rwanda.

The Rwandan Defense Ministry has just reacted through Colonel Frank Mugambage, principal secretary of the Defense Ministry, who categorically denied the reports carried by the foreign media. He cited UNAMIR [UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda] blue berets, who operate on the border, and other UN observers as witnesses. According to Col. Frank Mugambage, the massacre was more likely to have been perpetrated by criminals roaming the region, armed and bloodthirsty as they were these days.

As to the rumors that the Rwandan Army conducted the attack, he said these could only be an element of the broad destabilization and denigration campaign against the current leadership. In this context, Col. Mugambage recalled the rumors about genocide which were already circulating on 6 April, rumors which, at the end of the day, brought shame to those who spread them.

On relations between Rwanda and Zaire, said to be at stake following these reports, Col. Frank Mugambage declared that no harm could come from telling the truth based on evidence.

Zaire

Refugee Death Toll, Skepticism Increases

LD1304205595 Paris Radio France International in French 1830 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Thirty-five dead is the latest toll of the attack on a Rwandan refugee camp in eastern Zaire on Tuesday evening. So far this commando has still not been identified. Yesterday Kinshasa made accusations against the Rwandan Patriotic Army, the army of the new regime of Kigali. These accusations were denied by Kigali this morning. Rwandan Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga, denied any involvement of the army and pointed the finger at extremist elements. [passage omitted] However, this denial from Kigali and the accusation of extremist involvement are not considered convincing in Kinshasa. Adan Sombo, the spokesman of the Zairean prime minister said so to Assane Diop:

[Begin Sombo recording] First, to begin with, for more than four days now the government in power in Kigali has been holding up a large quantity of foodstuffs intended for their own fellow citizens on our territory, on the pretext that this food would benefit the rebels or in the worst case those responsible for the genocide in Rwanda. That is first of all what has happened the closest to us [as heard], but for three weeks now Zaire has systematically come under fire as being the location

where Rwandan rebel refugees from their state were training in readiness to attack Rwandan territory, and even Burundi territory.

So, there are too many of these signs, and to conclude—an attack was carried out on Zairean territory, but it is claimed that it was not an attack by the Rwandan Popular Army, but in fact an attack by extremists. Please let us be serious. Which people at this time can leave Rwandan territory, and as the Rwandan interior minister stressed, with the current sensitive situation in the region, who are these people who can leave Rwandan territory with arms and ammunition in due form aboard three military craft to come and attack people on Zairean territory? [end recording]

[Announcer] We should mention that UN military officials deployed on the border between Rwanda and Zaire said this evening that they do not believe that Rwandan troops were responsible for the attack. The commander of the UN battalion based at Cyangugu, to the south of Lake Kivu, said that his men have not found any evidence that the Rwandan army was involved in this raid.

Troop Movements Reported in Shaba Province

AB1304170095 London BBC World Service in English
1505 GMT 13 Apr 95

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] There have been more rumblings of discontent in Zaire's southern province of Shaba. Formerly Katanga, it has been notorious for secessionist tendencies and rebellions. In December 1993, Shaba's governor, Gabriel Kyungu [wa Kumwanza], and the Katangese Nationalist Union of Independent Federalists and Republicans, UFERI, once again declared autonomy for Shaba. The central government ignored it and Governor Kyungu ended up under house arrest in Kinshasa, following reports that he was importing arms to Shaba. At the end of last month, there was a wave of strikes calling for Governor Kyungu's release. Now, there are reports of troop movements. On the line to Kinshasa, Julian Parker asked Arthur Molomolo of REUTERS NEWS AGENCY what information he had about what was happening in Shaba.

[Begin recording] [Molomolo] Yesterday, I had a phone conversation with the president of UFERI—that is a party led by Governor Kyungu, who is accused of trying to lead a secession—and [words indistinct] there were a lot of armed vehicles patrolling across three towns of Shaba. This report has been confirmed by independent sources.

[Parker] And where were these military vehicles deployed?

[Molomolo] Well, in three towns—that is Lubumbashi, Alimasi, and Kolwezi.

[Parker] Why were the armed vehicles patrolling these towns in Shaba?

[Molomolo] Well, because UFERI was planning to stage a number of actions in order to secure the getting back to Shaba of Governor Kyungu who is now in Kinshasa on secession allegations, because he is accused of having imported French-made missiles in order to launch a secession in July.

[Parker] Do you have information about exactly what kind of threat the population the population of these towns was using against the government?

[Molomolo] No, I don't know exactly anything about these actions, but (?they were reportedly) planning to launch actions in order to force the government to release Governor Kyungu; but I don't know the kind of actions they were planning to launch.

[Parker] What is happening today in Shaba? Is it still tense?

[Molomolo] No, no, no, no. I think the situation has subsided, because I just talked with the (?government) who confirmed that the Army High Command decided to withdraw its vehicles from circulation.

[Parker] Why did he decide to withdraw them?

[Molomolo] I think it is in an attempt to cool down the situation, because now they are likely to negotiate in order to know more about what (?is going on in those towns.)

[Parker] Is Governor Kyungu still fighting for the secession of Shaba?

[Molomolo] Well, I asked him that question. He told me no, he was not planning to do so. [end recording]

Somalia

Somaliland President Egal Offers To Step Down

EA1304220095 *Hargeysa Radio Hargeysa Voice of the Republic of Somaliland in Somali 1200 GMT 9 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the Republic of Somaliland, Mr. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, has disclosed that the National Army of the Republic of Somaliland has gained the upper hand over the anti-Somaliland militias who started hostilities in the town of Burco. The president, who gave a press conference at the presidency today, said the government had sent a delegation to Burco to ascertain the facts of the situation there.

Asked about the extension of his mandate as president, President Egal replied saying that his agreement to remain president of Somaliland would largely depend on the extension of the life of the government in office. The two issues were inseparable, according to the spirit of the Borama conference. The president added that if the life in office of government of the day was extended, his position as president and that of his vice president would remain unchanged. He said the extension of the term of the president in office was not for him as an individual to decide.

The president of the Republic of Somaliland reiterated that he was prepared to step down if he constituted an obstacle to peace in his capacity as president, as claimed by the anti-Somaliland group. He said no individual or community could impose itself on others in this country. The destiny of the Republic of Somaliland was a matter for the people to decide nationwide. He said if the anti-Somaliland militias laid down their arms out of loyalty to Somaliland, he would step down to pave the way for fresh elections in which everyone could participate. He added that Somaliland was independent and nobody's stooge. He appealed to the armed militias to lay down their weapons and participate in the country's affairs.

SNA Criticizes Reported UN Offer for Aid

EA1204214195 *(Clandestine) Radio Mogadishu Voice of the Great Somali People in Somali 1700 GMT 12 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] A statement issued by the Somali National Alliance [SNA] today states that the UN intervention left an aftermath of massacre and destruction of

property. The statement said it was surprising for the UN secretary general to hint that the United Nations wanted to return to Somalia under the pretext of participating in the reconciliation of the Somali people, forgetting about the ugly problems the United Nations had created, such as inciting organizations against one another, supplying arms and money to stir up civil war, facilitating the operations of most of the mutually hostile organizations, and channelling international aid meant for needy Somali people to setting up, financing, and arming organizations so that they could fight.

The SNA statement noted that scrutiny of the UN secretary general's statement revealed that the United Nations wanted to open an office in Somalia from which to continue financing the war, and to perpetuate the United Nations Operation in Somalia [UNOSOM]’s earlier incitement of Somalis. The fact of the matter was that Somalia did not regret the passing of the United Nations, as indicated by the return of stability to the capital, Mogadishu, and the cessation of the many killings and robberies. The statement added that this was proved by the report of Mr. (Elin), the EU representative, who visited Somalia three weeks after the departure of UNOSOM. Mr. (Elin) said in this respect that the only benefit Somalia derived from the United Nations was from the United Nations departure. He also said that more good work had been done in the country in the two weeks after UNOSOM left than throughout the two and a half years UNOSOM had been in Somalia.

The SNA statement also noted that was improper even to consider the United Nations return to Somalia, let alone saying that it would open an office. The Somali people did not need any interference from anyone, because they are able to settle their political problems by themselves.

Somaliland Minister of Foreign Affairs Dies

EA1304223395 *Hargeysa Radio Hargeysa Voice of the Republic of Somaliland in Somali 1200 GMT 7 Apr 95*

[FBIS Summary] Hassan Ali Diriye, alias Henry, the minister of state for foreign affairs of the Republic of Somaliland, and the administrator-general of Berbera District, died last night in Berbera.

Mandela Ends Gulf Tour; Confirms Wife's Post

EA1304220695 Nairobi Kenya Broadcasting Corporation Network in English 1600 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] The South African president, Nelson Mandela, today confirmed the reinstatement of Winnie Mandela to her job as deputy minister for arts, culture, science and technology. Addressing the press during a brief stopover in Nairobi on his way home from a Gulf tour, President Mandela said his government had noted some procedural irregularities in the sacking of Winnie and therefore reinstated her with full privileges. Mr. Mandela said his government of national unity did not want to be involved in legal disputes, although Winnie's sacking had been done in the belief that all government parties had been consulted as per the constitutional requirement.

He said he had a successful tour of the Gulf and expected delegations from the countries of the Gulf to visit South Africa with a view to invest there. [passage omitted]

Police Arrest Man With 20 kg Unenriched Uranium

MB1304205195 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network in English 2000 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Western Cape [Province] police have seized a large quantity of unenriched uranium and arrested a man in connection with the haul. Last month another man was arrested in the area, also for being in possession of the substance.

Police confiscated about 20 kg of unenriched uranium after receiving a tip-off from a member of the public. They arrested a 30-year-old Namibian on the West Coast after finding the toxic substance in his car.

[Begin Police Services spokesman Captain John Sterrenberg recording] I'm led to believe that it's an extremely toxic substance which, if it comes into contact with the air, can be dangerous to the environment and to anybody coming into contact with it. [end recording]

The Namibian will appear in court on Tuesday [18 April].

Zaire Opposes Afrikaner Migration, 'Meddling'

MB1304201995 Johannesburg WEEKLY MAIL & GUARDIAN in English 13-20 Apr 95 p 4

[Report by Rehana Rossouw]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Attempts by Afrikaner farmers to settle in Zaire have been greeted with dismay by opponents of the country's dictatorship who fear South African rightwingers are intent on establishing an Afrikaner homeland there and would find it hard to resist meddling in the country's politics.

A Zairean pro-democracy lobbying group, Freedom Flag for Congo-Zaire (FF), which established a branch in

Cape Town this year, is urgently seeking a meeting with the South African government to halt the trek of Afrikaners into their country.

Zairean dictator President Mobutu Sese Seko and his Minister of Agriculture Vivine Nlandu met a South African delegation on March 31 in Kinshasha exploring the possibility of Afrikaner farmers settling in Zaire. The seven-member delegation, led by Freedom Front leader and parliament's agriculture committee head Constand Viljoen, also met Zairean Defence Minister Mavua Mudhna, to discuss investment security guarantees for South African farmers.

Zaire's state television reported after the visit that South African investment in Zaire's agriculture could begin as early as June.

The FF was established in 1980 to campaign internationally for democracy in Zaire and an end to Mobutu's 30-year regime of terror.

Zaire, Africa's third largest country and one of the richest in natural resources, has much agricultural potential that has remained unexploited because of corruption and administrative chaos.

"Our country doesn't need Afrikaners as more than 60 percent of our people live in rural areas but cannot thrive because of indifferent government policies on agriculture," said Freedom Flag's study officer Jean Kalenga. Road infrastructure, for example, is so poor that agriculture products often rot inland.

"Those South Africans who do not want to live under black majority rule are now in search of new territories to apply their racist way of living. They should know that 96 percent of the Zairean population is black African just like their fellow countrymen in South Africa.

"Their present agreement signed with Mobutu will certainly be reconsidered once the people of Zaire take power and a responsible government is established".

Kalenga said the FF believed if Afrikaners were allowed to settle in Zaire they would build coalitions with Mobutu's mercenaries to ensure that they maintain the security of the regime they entered into an agreement with to lease land.

Afrikaner farmers have made similar excursions in Congo and Mozambique where they have offered their agricultural experience to help the country recover from the ravages of civil war.

Freedom Front spokesman Colonel Piet Uys said Afrikaner farmers were welcomed in neighbouring states. "Looking at South Africa they see a prosperous country and they want a little bit of that."

Freedom Flag has requested an urgent meeting with Raymond Suttner, chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, but no date has yet been set to discuss their objections to Afrikaners settling in Zaire.

Article Views ANC's 'Weakness in Leadership'
MB1204141995 Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 7 Apr 95 pp 28, 30

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A year ago, on the eve of the national election, few abroad gave SA [South Africa] much chance of avoiding civil war. The fault lines were apparent: black and white, black and black, rich and poor. Apartheid itself had drawn boundaries around the very geographical areas assessed as arenas of conflict.

This was more than a stock response of media hyenas sniffing bloodshed; the conservative British weekly, THE SPECTATOR, saw the looming war as primarily tribal with its nexus in Natal and the embittered soul of the Zulus. From there, the country would be engulfed by the inescapable contradictions of history. This did not happen. One explanation lies in the propaganda of "rainbowism"—the feel-good assertion of multicultural solidarity to be found in advertising, television and radio.

In effect, this amounts to a fragile belief that we have already united under a new flag, anthem and interim constitution. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu suggests in the wish-fulfilling title of his recent book, THE RAINBOW CHILDREN OF GOD, we have muddled through together—the Forrest Gumps of Africa.

This is well-meant, but silly. What we actually have is a coalition of groups united by self-interest. The Government of National Unity is the most glaring evidence of this coalition, but it is inherently unstable. The constitutional position of the National Party—that the life of the unity government be extended "for 10 or 20 years"—shows a deep-rooted fear of majority domination.

Even the laissez-faire sensitivities of the English are being squeezed: witness the stunned reaction to the displacement of their traditional concerns like rose-growing and classical music by the rap and rough tillage of SAfm radio.

A year into the life of the Government of National Unity, it appears that all partners are feeling the political equivalent of amour triste, the strange melancholy and foreboding that arises after making love.

Inkatha wants a trial separation, the Nationalists want an eternity ring; the small parties are exhausted by the duties of opposition; and the ANC finds itself presiding over a disorderly house.

As the senior partner in government, the Congress has only partially made the transition from liberation movement to ruling power. It exudes discomfort at the authority it has inherited, as if, to use its own phrase, it lacks a "mandate" to deal firmly with indiscipline, corruption and recidivist socialism.

The leading party displays an eerie inability to lead. The dilatory way in which Nelson Mandela dealt with the

festering poison of the Allan Boesak and Winnie Mandela scandals is symptomatic of the ANC's inertia in the face of populism.

This has not made for a crisis but for an interlinked series of enduring problems—masked to some extent by the return of economic buoyancy.

A crisis could, however, materialise within two years as ANC followers realise just how circumscribed their culture of entitlement will become under the pressures of severely limited resources.

Pre-eminently, there is the strain between the need to maintain fiscal discipline and social objectives that would translate into runaway expenditures. Within what could still be called the "broad church" of the ANC, responses to Finance Minister Chris Liebenberg's Budget have been overwhelmingly positive—if largely uncomprehending. Most rank-and-file parliamentarians have been expressing the fond hope that next year will see more done "for the poor." There is something disconcerting about the subtext of such a view: that the funds will somehow be there. But then the MPs are a privileged elite.

The take-home pay of the average parliamentarian—after party tithes—is in the region of R9,000 [rands] a month. This is a far cry from R7 a day—the sum paid to Natal labourers who recently built a bridge in terms of an RDP [Reconstruction and Development Program] project awarded to a private contractor.

The huge gap is significant only in that, at grassroots level, it has caused an upwelling of resentment, according to former priest and community worker Cosmas Desmond, who was banned in the Sixties for exposing the evils of resettlement at places like Limehill.

Rather than feeling that R7 a day is better than nothing, the workers feel cheated, according to Desmond—a white man who last year joined the Pan-Africanist Congress and stood (unsuccessfully) in the national election.

"In its first year," he muses, "government should have done some symbolic things. When I go to Limehill, nothing has happened for those people." He feels that rather than RDP promises, visible improvements like community centres and soccer fields would have been more appropriate in indicating to "the people" that they had not been forgotten.

At executive level, one can contrast this perception with the extraordinary performance last week of the Deputy Minister of Defence Ronnie Kasrils, who defended the need for guns and corvettes in Metternichian terms. "There are 16 wars in the world today," he intoned, addressing himself primarily to ANC "comrades" who want further Defence cuts. Excluding special provisions for the integration of various armies, Kasrils claimed, "the Defence budget has come down 50 percent since

1988." It now stands at 2.1 percent of GDP—comparable with Italy and Germany, and, in Africa, Kenya.

However, to ensure national security and the smooth running of elections, "deployment now is at the same level as at the height of apartheid's dirty wars...Capital costs have been cut...If Defence is cut further, we will have the troops on the ground but they will fall behind in terms of modern weaponry."

This heartfelt appeal to patriotism by a man best known for leading the charge at Bisho is not altogether risible. Kasrils reflects the accommodation between need and wish that constrains all government. After a year in office, he has emerged from his gauche chrysalis, defending his department's priorities with well-considered plausibility.

In apprising his colleagues of the bigger picture, Kasrils would deny neglecting the needs and wants of, say, the workers of Limehill.

But in truth—and as predicted—there is a schism developing between the ANC-aligned masses and those they elected to represent them. Both want essentially the same things: prosperity and jobs. But nothing chastens like the responsibilities of office, and Kasrils is aware that it is the task of the Cabinet to order spending priorities. Prosperity and jobs require stability and security.

Yet nowhere does the ANC display more uncertainty than in dealing with internal security—crime. In the same debate from which Kasrils came out as a hawk, the Democratic Party's Douglas Gibson alluded to the majority party's salutary attempts to invent a "human rights culture" in SA. "But what," he asked, "do they care about the victim?" Violent crime, he charged, had shown a 27 percent increase over the last five years.

This criminal culture furnishes for prospective foreign investors images as symbolically distinctive of the new SA as the sjambok [whip] was of the old. The burgled house, the hijacked car, the drive-by shooting and the brutalised woman do not encourage confidence. Nor do our lack of economic competitiveness, volatile unionists, and continued mutterings of a capital gains tax and minimum wage.

The ANC's weakness in leadership is not only evident in its alienation from the masses and its tardiness in dealing with charismatic miscreants. There remains a pervasive ambiguity about many of its public utterances on core constitutional issues.

It has at times reverted to positions that actually predate the Kempton Park agreement that led to the Government of National Unity. This often leaves its junior partners floundering or resorting to the sanction of withdrawal.

The essence of the ANC's ambivalence lies in its desire for a strongly centralist, majority-rule, and preemptively socialist State. In its constitutional document

BUILDING A UNITED NATION, released last week, it argues that the best way to secure provincial representation is through the 90-member Senate, a body whose functions are vague at present.

This statement has also helped create the conflict over Inkatha's continuation in the Constitutional Assembly. Mangosuthu Buthelezi is, in fact, correct in his accusation that the new document ignores the federalist implications or the agreement he signed with President Mandela and F. W. de Klerk in April last year. He sees a hardening of the ANC line against federal structures, therefore against himself.

The manifesto triggered regional dissent from Gauteng's Tokyo Sexwale at a weekend constitutional conference. While that was smoothed over, concern about the ANC's preferences for majority rule will endure and intensify as the life of the Government of National Unity wanes.

Furthermore, BUILDING A UNITED NATION contains some extraordinary additions to the list of fundamental rights enshrined in the interim constitution. They include a provision that "special and additional levels of protection shall be afforded to children who will have a right to be protected from neglect, abuse, exploitation or exposure to harm, as well as a positive right to basic nutrition and health care." This is a socioeconomic clause that does not belong in a workable Bill of Rights. The underlying principle can be summarised as: "The State shall provide."

The proposed children's rights foreshadow the most politically correct constitution in the world—but one minimally capable of being executed. The costs of such political correctness would exhaust the Treasury. As it is, the proliferation of statutory commissions on human rights and gender discrimination suggests a variation of the Peter Principle—that bureaucracy will expand exponentially irrespective of resources.

The progress of these commissions—as well as various select committees on legislation and the theme committees of the Constitutional Assembly—has been harrowingly slow. So slow that two weeks ago parliament suspended its proceedings for several days because it had no new legislation to consider.

Observers of the work of the committee have been struck by how often members seem incapable of deciding things for themselves; their perceived need to "consult" takes precedence even when the wording of some preamble is all that is at issue.

Hence the public report-backs, workshops and advertising campaigns: all time-consuming, largely unnecessary, and abdication of the responsibility to lead is a universal requirement of elected representatives. Yet this habit infests the ANC from top to bottom.

It can be said of the ANC that its greatest asset today remains what it has always been: the magnamity of President Mandela, his ability to surmount the fractious

politics of the day and to present the face of reconciliation both to SA and to the world beyond. Yet his strength is his party's weakness, since ultimately all its members defer to his executive authority unless they are in open revolt. This is true in the streets, on the factory floor, in party caucus and the committees dealing with constitutional and legislative minutiae.

The greatest policy challenge facing the ANC is to break with this ritualistic obeisance to Mandela's integrity and power. For any statesman, the spectre of *Apres nous le deluge!* must weigh heavily in considering succession and continuity. Mandela cannot be expected to take all the decisions.

A constitutional option which ought to be considered soon is that of separating the presidency from the executive along American lines. Such a separation—probably entailing the creation of the office of Prime Minister—could be beneficial, if only because it would curb the growth of an indigenous personality cult.

Mandela possesses an austere, dispassionate persona that he displays to great effect whenever he is called on to intervene; but his successor may not be so gifted. Thabo Mbeki, for example, is often simply opaque.

The besetting flaw of the ANC-in-government is its evident befuddlement in entire spheres of policy where its traditional constituency and allegiance pull one way, and realpolitik in another. A year in power has taught some of its members the uses and responsibilities of high office. Others will never learn, others rely on Mandela—and yet others will seek to take advantage of the coming crisis of confused and unmet expectations.

That crisis will run and run. In the next year, the centre must seek to consolidate its authority across party lines. A shake-out of the unity government is not just inevitable but desirable.

ANC's Ramaphosa on Increased Power to Provinces

MB1004171295 Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 10 Apr 95 p 8

[Commentary by ANC Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The ANC has proposed a new vision and a new framework for provincial governance which we call "co-operative governance". Few commentators have appreciated the nature or recognised the significance of this new model. Most look only at those provincial powers that are exercised within provincial boundaries, in their concern to pit province against central government.

The federalism/centralism debate has for some time been stuck in a sterile and one-dimensional quantification of discrete national and provincial law-making competencies.

The ANC has now adopted a proposal in which provinces are to become an important component of central government and national policymaking. Yet superficial analyses of the proposals have focused on one end of the equation and have ignored the fact that we are proposing that Parliament will also represent provincial interest directly.

The ANC conference, with important and critical input from the provinces, notably Gauteng, has refashioned its initial proposals to make it quite clear that the provinces will not be mere administrative bodies, nor, as the commentary to the original proposals suggested, will their law-making powers be confined to supplementary legislation. Indeed, as the proposals indicate, their policy-making executive and financial powers will be increased.

The ANC has recognised, (as increasingly have other political players), that our country's regions are economically interdependent, that our health, housing, educational, crime and other problems are national in character.

Solutions to them cannot be found solely within provincial boundaries, for "solutions" for one region which exacerbate the problems in another are not solutions.

None of our ideals and concerns would pre-empt effective regional governments.

There are two basic models for accommodating provincial aspirations in governance.

The first, of competitive federalism, involves a rigid geographical separation of the country and a rigid division of the powers of governance. The provinces compete with each other, and with central Parliament, over all issues including their jurisdictional boundaries.

In general such constitutions lack harmonising principles and integrating mechanisms. They are characterised by bloated bureaucracies, fractious regional relations, economic inefficiencies, and a tendency to disintegration. At the same time provincial perspectives are confined to the fringe, and provincial influence on national issues is minimal.

The second model, co-operative "federalism", is one which acknowledges regional diversity and promotes effective regional government, yet requires provinces to take into account the interests of other provinces and the country.

It recognises the importance of nation-building and it invites the provinces, as provinces, to take co-responsibility with central government for the management of SA [South Africa]. It requires that the province exercise collective powers over and in central government.

The ANC's proposals would greatly enhance the powers of the Senate by giving it a veto over National Assembly legislation affecting all provincial matters. It would also

be able to initiate such legislation, and to review other legislation dealing with national functions. Its members would be linked and responsible to the provincial governments.

This would give provinces a meaningful voice at national level which the present Senate does not do.

The ANC proposes this extension of real national powers to the provinces to establish a firm foundation for partnership between national government and the provinces.

Whereas the media has treated this proposal as sleight of hand—as only entrenching the primacy of the centre—it remains one of the most innovative additions to our current constitutional debate and will, we believe, significantly reshape the way SA is governed.

How will the provinces' domestic powers be affected by their increased law-making powers in Parliament? It needs to be stressed that the provinces' law-making competencies remain intact, (save for policing powers which were never properly a part of Schedule 6). The ANC proposals intend to bolster their executive powers significantly by conceding the right of provinces to be assigned the implementation of national and provincial legislation.

These "executive powers" are not menial bureaucratic administrative duties that other parties have suggested. They are the very powers that the President and Cabinet exercise in regard to national legislation.

On a more technical level, the proposals would place the onus of asserting the preminence of provincial legislation on the province.

The proposals do not, as some have suggested, diminish provincial competencies.

While the courts will continue to have jurisdiction over whether a provincial or national law is dominant, the tests requiring the court to determine the desirability or necessity of the legislation have been replaced by the power of the provinces to approve of the national legislation. Surely this cannot be regarded as a diminution of provincial powers?

In addition to the augmentation of their executive powers, the provinces will also gain greater financial and fiscal powers to participate in the drafting of the national budget. Overall the provinces will not have their current powers significantly amended, but will gain substantial new powers. We have no doubt our proposals conform to the agreed and binding constitutional principles.

It would be a mistake to construe these proposals as an opening "trade union" offer seeking to set out maximum positions, with ready fall back positions. These proposals will be taken to the Constitutional Assembly in deadly seriousness.

These proposals make clear that the ANC will not simultaneously grant vastly enhanced powers to the provinces to make national laws, and also grant them enhanced powers to ignore the very national norms and standards that they have approved.

If we allow this development, the logic of "co-operative governance" will collapse in on itself—the provinces, through the Senate, will cease to have meaningful roles in national legislation, and the provinces will be relegated to fringe fiefdoms.

Implicit in much of the criticism of the proposals is the belief that some of the provinces (notably KwaZulu/Natal and Western Cape) will have to surrender their current individual autonomy for the dubious benefit of being swamped by ANC senators. This is not true.

Firstly the current autonomy is protected. Secondly those who propagate this view have not absorbed the fact, much publicised, that the provinces have shown in inter-governmental meetings that they have established common ground with each other across the party political lines. This, after all, reflects international experience.

SA can't afford to get its constitutional structure wrong. To those who invite us to go the way of disintegrating and fractious provinces, we say we will not allow our country to go down that road.

We will not be discharging our responsibility to our fellow South Africans, their children and their children's children, by expedient concessions to unrealistic, sectional, unworkable, and continually escalating demands.

Article Assesses RDP Achievements

MB1104164695 Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 7 Apr 95 pp 24, 27

[FBIS Transcribed Text] It would be a mistake to dismiss the Reconstruction & Development Programme (RDP) because it has so far failed to match the politicians' extravagant promises. In that sense, it was always doomed to fall short and disappoint.

If the RDP had managed in 12 months to deliver 50,000 houses, a jobs boom and free schooling, alarm bells would be ringing. It would have been a gigantic capital works programme forced through for immediate political gain regardless of sustainability. That would have been foolhardy as the inflationary consequences of such consummate Keynesianism would have been dire.

In one sense it remains a danger. In another, the funding of the RDP from other departmental votes has given it a vocal role in helping to keep government focused on fiscal discipline. RDP Minister Jay Naidoo remarked in the Budget debate: "We don't want to end up like Mexico, which is in serious trouble economically because it was financing growth and consumption through short-term borrowing."

But a government's achievements, not only its good intentions, must be assessed periodically. In drawing up an RDP scoreboard, we must look at two aspects. What has actually been achieved? And what is likely to be achieved through sound vision and sensible planning?

The single substantial achievement—and virtually the only concrete one—has been the setting up of a primary school nutrition programme, at a cost of R475m [475 million rands] last year (slightly more this year). The programme is said to have reached almost 5.5m children by end-January 1995—95 percent of the estimated target, despite the lack of planning time (100 days after the presidential inauguration) and a staff shortage. It provides a peanut butter sandwich or 25 percent of a child's daily nutritional requirement.

One of the most important RDP undertakings is the provision of drinking water to remote rural communities.

The Department of Water Affairs has earmarked 12 regions, four of which have already started work or are about to start. A key concept here is that water is never provided free—even the poorest communities are expected to pay something.

When completed, the R200m water project should provide clean water, to international access standards, to more than 1.4m people in several hundred settlements around SA [South Africa]. Departmental officials and the commercial water boards like Umgeni Water have worked closely on the planning.

But the most important distinction between this and previous similar projects, says co-ordinator Hugo Sussens, is the extent of community involvement. Past water-provision programmes have been racked with problems, from illegal connections to outright sabotage. What's more, in many homeland regions clients were not expected to pay for their water.

The RDP is determined to end such practices. So far, all 12 regions have been brought into agreements with provincial authorities to pay connection, implementation and maintenance costs. Each region has appointed its own steering committee to represent its community. "Once they are set up, they do everything," says Sussens. "We just act as observers and try to stand back as much as possible."

Water provision seems to be in good hands; allied with Eskom's electrification programme—which also depends on consumer payments—the outcome will have beneficial effects on the economy.

Health is a crucial RDP area—and the one that seems most likely to go wrong. Nearly all the R25m set aside for clinics last year has been allocated for 170 specific health-care centres across the country. Some officials estimate that 2,000 clinics are now needed countrywide to meet present population needs. A further R65m will be divided this year among the nine provinces, for

upgrading of existing clinics and for new facilities. In each case, local communities are involved in developing the business plans and costing arrangements.

Much detailed planning has gone into this but the suspicion remains that there is too much idealism.

A major problem will be the staffing of these hundreds of clinics, most of them in rural areas. Doctors and nurses are unwilling to move into remote areas, where there are rarely adequate schools or attractive jobs for their spouses. The situation is bad enough in some city-based hospitals such as Johannesburg or Baragwanath.

Meanwhile, R166m has been drawn away from the budgets of the seven academic hospitals—which serve an important primary, low-cost health care function—and redirected to equipping and running the new clinics through provincial health departments.

At least the approach is now nationally co-ordinated. Says programme manager Dr Tim Wilson: "One of the most important contributions of the RDP fund has been to provide the stimulus for coordinating the fragmented clinic building programmes of the past into a single coordinated programme." But it is not clear how the clinics are to be staffed. Surely this question must receive a solid answer before building operations begin?

If confused priorities are one problem, red tape is another. The Aids Awareness & Prevention Campaign is one example of an RDP programme that could not get started last year because of excessive red tape. One of 22 Presidential Lead Projects established to kick-start the RDP, the R22m Aids programme, has been mired in committee discussions and community consultations for months. Funded from within the Health Department, the Aids programme director was appointed on January 1—but had no time to appoint ancillary staff before going on maternity leave.

Hasty decisions, the opposite of red tape, have also caused problems. Last May, President Nelson Mandela's unexpected triggering of the R485m provision of free health care for pregnant women and children under six led to severe strain on health services. Clinics and hospitals were swamped with patients seeking all sorts of treatment, much of it unrelated to pregnancy. And it's hard to undo the damage.

The flagship programme of the RDP, however, remains the massive housing & infrastructure project—taking up almost half of the R6bn total RDP expenditure. Of the R326m allocated to housing last year, only about R20m was spent. But R230m was committed to subsidise the purchase of 200,000 low-income houses.

This, coupled with an 80 percent increase in the allocation from the Budget (to R2.9bn or 3.4 percent of all spending), indicates a dramatic increase in house-building once technical and legislative deadlocks are overcome. When this will be, though, is anybody's guess.

Housing Minister Sankie Mthembu-Nkondo said this week that SA's urban housing shortage is about 1.5m and will take at least 10 years to eliminate. This may be wishful thinking on her part as her Ministry has had to trim its sails once before, when it admitted the RDP would probably not deliver more than 70 percent of the million it originally promised would be finished in five years.

RDP housing delivery, meanwhile, has been embarrassingly slow. Only 878 homes were completed by late February and these were mostly targeted at higher-income buyers in the Free State and Gauteng who qualify for bond finance and government subsidies.

There are many reasons for the delay. The builders' warranty mechanism, a guarantee against faulty construction, has not been put in place largely because, says the monthly independent newsletter RDP MONITOR, "the estimated cost, including administration, is R95m a year, adding R1,500 to the cost of a R45,000 house." Banks will not lend to low-cost projects without this guarantee; they already have about 16,000 repossessed properties on their hands.

The Development Facilitation Bill, intended to speed up land delivery, has been postponed to mid-year. And the White Paper on Housing is still bogged down in discussion, with amendments likely.

The entire RDP depends on the recently initiated Operation Masakhane, a project that seems to be bearing fruit, though it is still too early to assess nationally. Eskom recently reported a dramatic reversal of the Soweto electricity tariff boycott, from only 20 percent of payments four months ago to 65 percent. But only 22 black councils are charging economic rates for services now; fewer than 30 percent of residents pay anything at all.

Unless Masakhane succeeds in smashing the townships' decade-long rent, services and bond boycotts, the townships will not rise out of poverty. It is imperative that they raise more money to provide a stimulus for capital investment in housing and urban renewal programmes.

The new financial year has added another 14 Presidential Lead Projects to the original 22. These include large-scale urban renewal projects, land restitution and redistribution programmes, a national literacy programme, public works for job creation and a R100m discretionary allocation to the nine provinces.

In addition to the lead projects, virtually every government department and every province has identified RDP programmes to be funded from their own resources or national departmental grants.

There are some encouraging aspects. We must remember that the RDP is not meant to be a benefits programme but a catalyst (cynics call it a religion). Its first aim is to turn government into a facilitating agency; each State department, provincial authority and municipality must

do the job on the ground. RDP progress will be measured by the ability of these agencies to respond, as much as by the money spent.

The RDP will have to engage the private sector. Government will not build houses; private developers and banks will—provided the risks are not too high.

Finally, the RDP recognises that when development programmes are up and running, government should withdraw where possible. Even now, it urges government to limit its commitments. The daunting challenge of upgrading urban infrastructure, for example, could cost R35bn in the next five years, according to the RDP office. But only 20 percent of the capital will come from central government. The markets and local government revenues must provide the rest.

"The government's commitment must be matched by private sector investment," says Naidoo, "otherwise the public sector investment will not trigger growth and socioeconomic development and the services will not be sustainable."

For all of that, the RDP is also a political programme, bound up with the ideals of populist democracy and redistributive socialism. The Nats [National Party] spent 42 years despoiling the economy: the ANC fought back by making it ungovernable. Now the mess has to be cleared.

A strength and weakness of the RDP approach lies in the system of government control. Because the RDP fund is raised by drawing off regular departmental budgets, it amounts to a process of taking away and returning money. And the only way a department can recoup or claim RDP funds is to submit a detailed business plan, outlining how the money is to be spent and what provisions have been made to sustain the programme. Only once this plan is approved will the funds be released.

The procedure is bureaucratic and time consuming acknowledges, RDP national programme manager Roy Page-Shipp, but it is the only way to ensure that the programmes adhere to the principles of the RDP—in other words that they are people-driven and self-sustaining.

Meanwhile, some kind of a scoreboard in the main areas of endeavour has indeed emerged. From the top, then:

- The school feeding scheme is a clear and worthy achievement—but it must be carefully monitored to prevent corruption and to ensure that resources are always diverted to those most in need;
- Planning for the provision of water to rural communities has been swift but sensible, noting the importance of user charges and with the emphasis on what is possible rather than what is desirable;
- Housing plans are broadly acceptable and their success depends more on clearing technical and legal obstacles than on any new policy; and

—Health planning seems to be over-ambitious and oblivious of realities in the hospitals, raising the danger of the old system collapsing before the new one is in place. And there is the fatal ideological flaw (as in education) that all public health should be free of charge.

If there is a lesson that has emerged, it is that plans which empower people by demanding some payment—as already accepted in housing and water supply—are the ones which stand the greatest chance of success. The other route—taken by health and education planners—will lead to disaster.

Secondly, the modesty of its accomplishment will be its main virtue until there is a manifest commitment to the growth that will provide the jobs needed to sustain its momentum.

New KwaZulu/Natal Police Head Discusses Issues

MB1304201795 Johannesburg WEEKLY MAIL & GUARDIAN in English 13-20 Apr 95 p 6

[Report by Ann Eveleth]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] An enormous man with a thick Afrikaans accent, Major-General Chris Serfontein might appear an unlikely candidate for the job of dragging KwaZulu/Natal's two rather tarnished police forces into the new South Africa.

But after "32 years and three months in the force with 64 years' overtime" the former Eastern Transvaal commissioner says he is under no illusions about the enormous task he faces as the new KwaZulu/Natal police commissioner.

Although KwaZulu/Natal was the last of five posts Serfontein would have chosen in the new police service, he says he has no regrets: "I am a dedicated Christian and I believe the hand of God is in my life. I prayed about my applications and once I realised he wanted me to come here I was totally committed to it."

Born in the Orange Free State to a Calvinist family, Serfontein joined the police force "to do God's work" at the tender age of 17 and rose quickly to become a detective, and later PWV [Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging] deputy commissioner before being posted in the Eastern Transvaal.

Observers point out that Serfontein distinguished himself from the apartheid security apparatus by butting heads with it in an attempt to upgrade the detective services and by steering clear of the notorious Security Branch throughout his lengthy career. Serfontein says he has spent most of his career "as a detective investigating crime against black communities and serving those communities".

"I never supported the ideology of the past and don't have problems serving any human being regardless who he or she is—my Christian background ground demands it of me," he adds. Serfontein says he began advocating community policing forums in the early 1980s, "but the time was right, the SAP [South African Police] didn't have the support of the black community back then".

Serfontein admits he will have to walk a political tight-rope to solve the police legitimacy problem in KwaZulu/Natal, and promises to adopt an even-handed approach from the beginning.

Refusing to be drawn on exactly how his administration will tackle the ongoing allegations of KwaZulu Police hit-squads, the General simultaneously pledges his support to ongoing investigations and warns against acceptance of "wild allegations made for selfish purposes".

On the one hand, Serfontein says he will "assist every process aimed to get rid of any criminality in the ranks of both forces and says he would be naive to deny there were any bad apples in either force". But, on the other, the Commissioner says, "I must stress that at this stage, nothing has been proven and I believe the people involved to be innocent until proven guilty ... but if you have *prima facie* evidence and you have nothing else to prove the contrary, then you have to make contrary difficult decisions," he added.

Holding to what he perceives as his greatest challenge—impartiality—Serfontein warns that years of divisive politics has taken its toll on the province's police forces: "The problem with strong opposing political parties is that police get caught in the middle and accused by both sides of not doing their job. We have to demonstrate our impartiality to gain the respect of all political parties."

Serfontein hopes the amalgamation of the former South African Police and KwaZulu Police forces under one umbrella will help, but says a political solution will ultimately be needed to bring peace to the province: "Our job is to provide safety and security and a stable climate to give the politicians time to find a solution."

Angola**Luanda 'Not Happy' With Butrus-Ghali Report to UN**

MB1304131395 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1200 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Angolan Government is not at all happy with the report UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali presented to the UN Security Council on 7 April. UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali blamed the Angolan Government for failing to abide by the terms of the Lusaka Protocol. The government made public its reaction today. Dr. Sabino Ferraz, Council of Ministers deputy secretary, read the communique:

This communique has been issued by the Angolan Government. The government of the Republic of Angola hereby conveys its grave concern with regard to the report on the situation in Angola as presented by UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali on 7 April. That report bears no connection with reality or the current situation of the Angolan peace process. The failures attributed to the Angolan Government in the aforementioned report were described as constraints on the deployment of UN peace-keeping forces in this country. Those charges do not reflect the government's current level of fulfillment of its duties in the Angolan peace process.

2. [number as heard] With its imprecisions, this report can cause serious damage to the peace process because of the inhibitions and fears it could eventually prompt in the international community. In view of that, the Angolan Government finds it necessary to clarify the problems listed by the UN secretary general in his report. Thus, the following issues are hereby clarified:

Substantive progress has been made concerning the de facto cessation of hostilities. However, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA, has continued to receive supplies by air from the Republic of Zaire in flagrant violation of the relevant UN Security Council's resolutions.

Concerning the placement of UN verification mechanisms, the deployment of military observers and UN police has been carried out in full. At this stage, and in accordance with the plan, there are UN officials in 59 areas of Angolan territory.

With regard to the troop disengagement process, the Angolan Government believes that process is over in accordance with the terms of the Lusaka Protocol's first phase, fourth stage, and in accordance with the stipulations contained in Paragraphs A and B of the section on the bilateral cease-fire.

With regard to military data, the government delivered the information requested by the United Nations in accordance with the terms of the Lusaka Protocol's first

phase, fourth stage, as reflected in Paragraph C of the section on the bilateral cease-fire.

As for advancing the start of mine removal operations, the Angolan Government has already told the United Nations that it has assembled 800 mine removal experts. The government is now waiting for the UN Angola Verification Mission [Unavem]-3 to produce the necessary plans. At this stage, the government cannot be blamed for delays in the implementation of the mine removal process.

Concerning confinement points for the UNITA troops, the Angolan Government believes it is the exclusive responsibility of Unavem-3 to prepare those areas, which were agreed on in the government-UNITA military leadership meeting held under the auspices of the United Nations.

With regard to installations for Unavem-3 personnel, the government would like to make it clear that it made available to Unavem-3 everything that had been agreed on and that it was asked.

With regard to Catumbela Air Base, the government would like to stress that it never refused Unavem-3 the right to use that airstrip. Furthermore, this settles the problem connected with the deployment of logistics forces which must operate from Catumbela Airport.

Concerning the (?main) accord, the government would like to make it clear that some delays have indeed occurred, but those delays have been overcome. The signing of that accord is expected to take place before 15 April.

3. The government of the Republic of Angola hereby calls on the UN Security Council's member states to demand from the UN secretary general that he update his 7 April report by using data now in the hands of the UN special representative in Angola, so the Angolan case can be dealt with on the basis of a document that reflects the current situation of the peace process.

The government of the Republic of Angola hereby reaffirms its firm determination to act in good faith and to remain committed to the Lusaka Protocol's implementation.

[Issued] Luanda, 13 April 1995

[Signed] The government of the Republic of Angola

UNITA Group Arrives To Discuss Savimbi Meeting

MB1304204395 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1900 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] delegation that will work with the government to prepare a meeting between President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi already has arrived in Luanda. The

delegation is led by Jorge Valentim, head of the peace accords coordination office. In a reconciliatory speech, Jorge Valentim saluted the Catholic Church, Angolan political parties, and Angolan women, whom he said were working for peace. Valentim said everything will be done so the meeting's preparatory work will be a success:

[Begin Valentim recording] It is a big honor and a great pleasure for us to be here in Luanda today, the capital of our common fatherland, to carry out a very important and noble mission mandated by UNITA President Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi. This mission is aimed at preparing a meeting at the highest level between his Excellency President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA President Dr. Savimbi. We hope and are confident that the work to be carried out by the Lusaka Protocol signatories will be very successful. We will do all we can to guarantee its success for the welfare of all the Angolan people. [end recording]

Sudan

Khartoum Agrees To Hand Over Ethiopian Hijackers

EA1304221795 Paris AFP in English 1329 GMT
13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Khartoum, April 13 (AFP)—The Sudanese government has officially agreed to hand over to Addis Ababa five Ethiopian nationals who last

month hijacked an Ethiopian domestic flight to Sudan, a state-owned daily reported Thursday [13 April].

Justice Minister Abdul Aziz Shiddo said Khartoum agreed to return the hijackers after it received an official request from Meles Zenawi's government and completing interrogation of the five men, Al-Engaz al-Watani.

The aircraft, an Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737, was on an internal flight from Addis Ababa to Bahr Dar last month when the hijackers, aged between 18 to 23, threatened the pilot, saying they wanted to taken to Sweden where they were planning to ask for asylum.

The pilot declared that he was short of fuel and landed at El Obeid in the western Sudan. The plane, with its seven crew and 85 passengers, including four US and four French nationals were on board the plane which was flown home after Sudanese authorities convinced the hijackers to surrender.

The Sudanese prosecutor-general Abdel Rhaan Ibrahim told the paper that the authorities studied the Ethiopian request and after seeing it was compatible with Sudanese laws agreed to hand over the hijackers for trial.

He said that the decision was taken in accordance with an agreement between the two countries, 1966, on exchange of criminals in accordance with international laws and agreements.

Nigeria**Ikimi Briefs Diplomatic Corps on Developments**

AB1404084195 Lagos NTA Television Network in English 2000 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Foreign affairs minister, Chief Tom Ikimi, met with the diplomatic community in Nigeria today. The thrust of the meeting was to brief them on developments in the country, and the foreign policy posture of the Federal Government. Chief Ikimi highlighted that a stable and prosperous Nigeria will be a great asset to the international community. Foreign news correspondent Kaindi Yonkare reports:

[Begin recording] [Yonkare] Nigeria's commitment to world peace and stability in Africa has been recognized and praised. Today however, this track record, Chief Ikimi went on to say, has escaped the attention of some of her friends as a result of recent developments in the country which, he said, her detractors have distorted. Chief Ikimi called attention to Nigeria's complex and heterogeneous society on which, he said, any one who wished to understand Nigeria, must first shed any pre-suppositions.

Explaining further, the minister said Nigeria has never pretended to live in isolation nor is she blind and deaf to changes around her. Rather, Nigeria was plunged into crisis and the process now engaged in is an ongoing program of renewal and reconstruction. Nigerians, he acclaimed, are inherently democratic. It is, therefore, a matter for regret that the international community has been misled to ignore the achievements of the present administration while focusing on the arrest and trial of Chief Moshood Abiola. The minister reiterated Nigeria's respect for her traditional friends but argued that even close allies disagree and, as such, the friendship is measured by the caution with which both parties approach one another.

[Ikimi] It is simply obvious that today the majority of Nigerians can once again go about the peaceful pursuit of their business without fear and intimidation. The enabling environment has been sustained so that the representatives of the people may continue to deliberate upon proposals for the constitutional arrangements upon which that democratic state we see shall be established.

[Yonkare] He said political and economic reforms cannot be implemented without a solution to the problem of external debt. He warned that with 30 percent of Nigeria's total foreign exchange earnings devoted to debt servicing, 50 percent of her debt stock is

as a result of interest rate charges, arrears, and rescheduling. Therefore, Nigeria and, indeed, the rest of Africa cannot be expected to bear the burden of courageous political and economic reforms without substantial debt relief, and seeking to reinvigorate the economy. Chief Ikimi then made this pledge:

[Ikimi] The revitalization of the Nigerian economy will undoubtedly contribute to a reinvigoration of the economies of the West African subregion, and strengthen our collective commitment to regional economic cooperation and integration.

[Yonkare] On the issues of drug trafficking and the advance fee fraud, the minister affirms that Nigeria is neither a producer nor consuming nation but has the stiffest laws for drug offenders in the world. Similarly, legislation has been enacted to combat money laundering and fraud. He, however, noted that for advance fee fraud to succeed, there must be complicity on the other side, and appealed to the international community to check the nefarious activities of some of their nationals. The minister said that all Nigeria asks for is goodwill and cooperation while not unmindful of her duty to strengthen the pride and honor of her nationhood. [end recording] [video shows minister addressing the diplomatic community]

Senegal**4 French Tourists Disappear Along Casamance Coast**

LD1304133995 Paris France-Inter Radio Network in French 1200 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that four French people have been missing in Casamance [Senegal] for a week. They are two couples from Saint Etienne who disappeared in an area regarded as one of the rear bases of the Senegalese independence fighters. Pape Toure reports from Dakar for France Inter:

[Toure] The two French couples left in a Nissan four-wheel drive vehicle for the Cape [Cap Skirring]. They have not been seen since. Once the authorities in Ziguinchor were alerted, they started a search with the Senegalese Army, which carried out a aerial search on Wednesday [12 April] which proved fruitless.

Several theories are being discussed, and none can be ruled out: a kidnapping, a blunder, or a clash with rebels. There is nothing to go on at this time. The MFDC [Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces] denies any involvement with the disappearance of the two French couples who come from Saint Etienne. Meanwhile, the search is continuing actively.

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